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1 Introduction
A growing finance literature investigates contagion effects of corporate bankruptcies (e.g.,
Lang and Stulz (1992), Hertzel, Li, Officer, and Rodgers (2008), Benmelech and Bergman
(2011)). Hertzel and Officer (2012) examine banks’ provision of debt financing following a
bankruptcy filing, and suggest that financial intermediaries such as banks are likely to play an
important role in transmitting bankruptcy shocks across the bankrupt firm’s industry peers.
While industry contagion effects in the bank loan market have been previously documented,
the existence and extent of geographic pricing effects in banks’ financing decisions remains an
open question. In this paper, we examine the impact of local bankruptcies on the pricing of
debt capital for geographically proximate firms. We also identify potential channels through
which geographic contagion effects arise in the bank loan market.
In theory, a bankruptcy filing might induce a negative or positive effect on loan terms
of local firms. Theories on contagions effect predict that an individual distress event can
propagate and generate negative spillover effects on local firms via information, liquidity,
or risk-based channels (Kaminsky, Reinhardt, and Vegh (2003), Brunnermeier and Peder-
sen (2009), Vayanos (2004)). In contrast, endogenous growth models (e.g., Medearis (1997),
Aghion and Howitt (1992)) highlight the role of competition and posit that a removal of a
competitor, as a result of a bankruptcy filing, improves market power of surviving firms. As
a result, these firms may receive more favorable loan terms in the aftermath of a bankruptcy.
Given these competing theoretical views, the impact of a bankruptcy filing on loan charac-
teristics of local firms is an open empirical question.
Using data on bankruptcy filings of all publicly listed firms in the U.S. between 1990 and
2013, we show that spreads on new and renegotiated loans increase significantly for firms
that are located in a 50 kilometer county-radius surrounding a firm entering bankruptcy.
This geographic contagion effect is transitory and lasts for about one year following a local
bankruptcy.
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Specifically, in univariate tests, we find that loan spreads increase by over 7 basis points,
on average, in the year following a local bankruptcy. Further, in multivariate regressions
where we control for a large set of firm- and loan-level characteristics, as well as various sets
of time varying fixed effects at the industry and state-year level, we again find an average
increase in local loan spreads of 7 basis points. This magnitude represents an increase of
3.4% in the cost of debt financing relative to the average loan spread in our sample. Results
increase to 10 basis points if we perform a propensity score matching and still amount to
6.2 basis points if we condition on within-borrower variation by including borrower fixed
effects. In addition to an increase in loan spreads, we also observe increases in covenant and
collateral requirements, as well as a decrease in loan maturities.
We conduct several additional tests to ensure the robustness of our results. For example,
one may argue that the local contagion effect we document might be attributed to a selection
bias whereby only firms with impecunious business outlook would apply for a loan after a
local bankruptcy. To address this concern, we follow Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2005), and
measure the degree of selection bias on observables to make inferences about selection bias
on unobservables. Specifically, we show that the effect of unobservables would need to be 3.78
times stronger than the effect of two important control variables, ROA and asset tangibility,
to deplete our main effect to zero, which is highly unlikely.
Next, we conduct additional tests to ensure our results are distinct from the industry
contagion effects documented in Hertzel and Officer (2012). Specifically, we re-estimate our
main specification after excluding all geographically proximate firms that operate in the same
industry as the firm filing for bankruptcy. In addition, based on BEA Input-Output data,
we exclude local firms operating in industries with significant economic exposure to that of
the filing firm. As a further robustness test, we relax the definition of geographic proximity
and define local firms as those located in a 100 or 200 kilometer county radius surrounding
a filing firm, respectively. We also adjust our geographic proximity measure for variation in
population density. In all cases, the local bankruptcy effect remains statistically significant
and economically meaningful.
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We also examine potential mechanisms that could generate geographic contagion in the
bank loan market. Longstaff (2010) describes three possible mechanisms for contagion effects.
The first one is contagion due to an information effect, i.e., negative shocks to one firm
may reflect economic news that directly affect the collateral values or cash flows of other
firms (Kiyotaki and Moore (2002), Kaminsky, Reinhardt, and Vegh (2003)). In this scenario,
contagion would be interpreted as the transmission of information from one firm to other
firms. We directly investigate this potential channel by examining whether local bankruptcies
lead to a deterioration of other local firms’ collateral values, default ratings, bankruptcy
propensities, CDS spreads, and stock valuations. We find none of these to be the case.
Thus, local bankruptcies do not seem to convey any new information about local economic
conditions.
The second mechanism described by Longstaff (2010) refers to contagion effects through
capital providers (in our case banks) who suffer losses due to the shock in one market. As
a result, they may find their ability to provide capital impaired, potentially leading to a
downward spiral of reduced capital supply via a “flight to quality” (Allen and Gale (2000),
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009)). In this mechanism, contagion occurs through impaired
balance sheets of lenders caused by the local bankruptcy. To examine whether the local
contagion effect operates through banks’ balance sheets, we consider subsamples of banks
that do not lend to local bankrupt firms or belong to the top 30 largest banks. Our key result
remains robust to this modification. Furthermore, we obtain financial information of lenders
via hand-matching lender names in Dealscan with those in the WRDS Bank Regulatory
database. We show that our effect is not driven by poorly performing banks or banks that
are under-capitalized. Collectively, these pieces of evidence render little support for a bank
balance sheet channel.
The third type of contagion described by Longstaff (2010) is a risk-based explanation. In
this mechanism, contagion effects occur because a local shock increases uncertainty regarding
the local geographical area. In line with this view, we find that our results are stronger when
local bankruptcies are informationally opaque. We proxy for informational opaqueness by
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the extent to which local bankruptcies are covered by the news media, and by the ratio
of intangible assets of the bankrupt firm. We also find that our main effect intensifies for
borrowers that are young or locate in remote areas, i.e., borrowers that should be associated
with higher informational asymmetries.
Finally, we examine whether we observe a “flight-to-home” effect following a local
bankruptcy, whereby lenders retreat from the local credit market or increase prices for loans
where they presumably have less information (Giannetti and Laeven (2012) and De Haas
and Van Horen (2013)). We indeed find that our main result is stronger for lenders with lim-
ited local exposure and for transaction lenders. These results suggest that local lenders and
relationship lenders are better able to overcome informational asymmetries (Bolton, Freixas,
Gambacorta, and Mistrulli (2016) and Beck, Degryse, Haas, and van Horen (2018)). In line
with this view, we find that the fraction of relationship loans relative to transaction loans
increases after a local bankruptcy.
Taken together, these results suggest that the contagion effect we document does not
operate through signaling a weakening local economy. It is also unlikely to be driven by
lenders’ impaired balance sheets. Rather, temporary heightened uncertainty and information
asymmetry after a local bankruptcy event seems to be the main driver of our results.
This paper contributes to the literature on the determinants of financial contagion. Lang
and Stulz (1992) and Ferris, Jayaraman, and Makhila (1997) investigate bankruptcy conta-
gion effects on investors of industry peers. Further, Hertzel, Li, Officer, and Rodgers (2008)
examine bankruptcy contagion effects along the supply chain of filing firms, while Boone and
Ivanov (2012) define proximate non-filing firms as strategic alliance partners. Finally, Jorion
and Zhang (2007) investigate bankruptcy contagion effects on industry capital providers.
We complement this literature by adding the new dimension of geography to bankruptcy-
induced contagion. Specifically, we document and quantify geographic contagion effects in
loan spreads and other loan characteristics following corporate bankruptcies.
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The paper most closely related to ours is that of Hertzel and Officer (2012), who examine
industry loan spread contagion effects surrounding a bankruptcy filing by an industry rival.
Their main finding is that loans originated in an industry bankruptcy wave have higher
spreads than loans originated in other industries. We show that there is a similar effect on
the geographic dimension. Our result complements the evidence on industry contagion and
adds to our understanding of how financial shocks are transmitted across firms.
Beyond the literature on financial contagion, our paper contributes to a growing finance
literature that examines how geographic proximity affects corporate decisions. For example,
Chhaochharia, Kumar, and Niessen-Ruenzi (2012) show that firms with a high fraction of
local investors exhibit better corporate governance. Further, Parsons, Sulaeman, and Titman
(2018) show that, due to cultural factors, financial misconduct increases with the frequency of
misconduct among geographically proximate firms. Our paper contributes to this literature
by showing that bankruptcies of geographically proximate firms affect credit conditions of
local non-filing firms, as lenders appear to adjust credit conditions downward for all firms
located in the same geographical area.
2 Data and summary statistics
2.1 Bank loan data
Our initial sample includes public companies in the United States with financial data avail-
able on Standard & Poors’ Compustat database extracted over the period from 1990 to
2013.1 We exclude firms with missing data on assets, cash, sales, earnings before interest,
tax and depreciation (EBITDA) and headquarter location. We also remove utility (SIC from
4910 to 4939) and financial firms (SIC from 6000 to 6999) since the financial policies of these
firms are subject to statutory capital requirements or regulatory supervision in a number of
states.
1According to Graham, Li, and Qiu (2008), Dealscan converts loan spreads that are not based on LIBOR
into LIBOR terms by adding or subtracting a differential which is adjusted periodically. Therefore, our sample
also includes loans that are originally priced on a non-LIBOR basis, but then converted by Dealscan.
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Our bankruptcy sample includes bankruptcy filings of public firms obtained from New
Generation Research and the UCLA-LoPucki Bankruptcy Research Database. New Gen-
eration Research provides a comprehensive dataset of bankruptcy filings for major public
companies. The UCLA Bankruptcy Research Database includes data on all large and public
company bankruptcies. The database includes large firms with reported assets worth at least
$100 million in 1980 dollars. To be included in our sample, these firms must have geograph-
ical information including county and state. Then, they are matched with the Standard and
Poor’s Compustat database. The final sample comprises 2,474 corporate bankruptcy filings
from 1990 to 2013.
We obtain data on individual loan contracts from LPC-Reuters’ Dealscan database.
Dealscan provides information on loans made to medium and large-sized U.S. and foreign
firms. We obtain information on all dollar-denominated loans made by U.S. lenders to U.S.
borrowers from 1990 to 2013. The matching of Dealscan and Compustat data for the period
from 1990 to 2007 is performed using the linkage database from Chava and Roberts (2008).
For the data from 2008 to 2013, we match Dealscan and Compustat using ticker and com-
pany names. Following the prior literature (Hertzel and Officer (2012) and Ivashina (2009)),
the largest tranche in each deal is one observation. To be included in our sample, we require
borrowers to have non-missing location information (i.e., either ZIP code or county and state
of corporate headquarters must be available). Table 1 reports the number of loans and the
number of bankruptcy filings for each year in our sample.
Loans are distributed fairly evenly across the sample. While there are 305 loans in 1990,
the maximum number of newly initiated loans amounts to 1,056 in 1997. The annual number
of bankruptcy filings ranges from 48 in 1994 to 255 in 2001, reflecting the burst of the Tech-
bubble and the subsequent economic downturn.
2.2 Location data
We obtain historical geographical information of firms’ headquarters from SEC Analytics
Suite and Compustat. We focus on the location of corporate headquarters rather than the
state of incorporation, since corporate headquarters form the strategic center of a firm and
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are presumably more relevant for lenders’ decisions on granting a loan. Specifically, a firm’s
location is defined based on county and state of its headquarters. We collect the latitude
and longitude at the centroid of each U.S. county from the U.S. Census Bureau Gazetteer.
To estimate geographic proximity, we use the Haversine Formula and compute the distance
between two counties, d1,2, as:
d1,2 = R× 2× arcsin(min(1,√a)); R ≈ 6, 378 kilometers;
a = (sin( lat2−lat1
2
))2 + cos(lat1)× cos(lat2)× (sin( lon2−lon1
2
))2.
We define firms to be geographically close to a bankruptcy event if they are located in
counties within a 50 kilometer radius surrounding the headquarter county of a firm filing for
bankruptcy in a given year.
The distribution of bankruptcy filings across U.S. states is presented in Figure 1. As
expected, bankruptcies are more frequent around economic centers of the U.S. Specifically,
most bankruptcies are observed in California, New York, New Jersey, Florida and Texas. In
Panel B of Table 1, we list the top 20 counties with the most bankruptcies in our sample.
Again, we observe that most bankruptcies occur in counties belonging to large economic
centers of the U.S., with the highest fraction of firms filing for bankruptcy in New York
County (5.54%), Los Angeles County (4%), and Dallas County (3.8%).
2.3 Summary statistics
After merging observations from all databases, our final sample comprises 14,040 loans that
are held by 4,711 firms. The sample period is from 1990 to 2013. All variables are defined in
more detail in Appendix A. Summary statistics are reported in Table 2.
Panel A displays average and median loan and firm characteristics as well as their stan-
dard deviations. The mean loan spread in our sample, defined as all-in-spread-drawn, is
209.64 basis points. The mean coupon, defined as spread over LIBOR, is 205.84. Average
deal size is $310 million USD, and loans have an average maturity of about 45 months. Most
of our sample loans are secured (72%) and do not involve relationship lenders. Overall, sum-
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mary statistics of our sample are very similar to those in Hertzel and Officer (2012), who
investigate industry contagion in loan spreads.
Panel B compares average loan and firm characteristics between local firms, i.e., firms that
are geographically close to a bankrupt firm, and non-local firms. Firms entering bankruptcy
are excluded from the sample. We find that loan spreads of local firms are significantly larger
than spreads of non-local firms. Loans of local firms do not differ in terms of loan amounts,
but do have significantly shorter maturities on average. At the same time, local firms have
lower return on assets and higher cash flow volatility. These differences mandate that we
control for time-varying firm characteristics in all subsequent regressions.
3 Effect of bankruptcies on local credit conditions
3.1 Estimation framework
To quantify the impact of local bankruptcies on geographically proximate firms, we define
a dummy variable that is equal to one for all firms headquartered in counties within a 50
kilometer radius surrounding a firm that filed for bankruptcy in the previous year, and
zero otherwise. Following Hertzel and Officer (2012), we define the logarithm of loan all-
in-drawn spread (which equals spread+annual fee) as the main dependent variable. Firms
entering bankruptcy are dropped from the sample to avoid a mechanical relation between
loan spreads and local bankruptcies.
Our econometric specification includes a set of control variables that are standard in
the literature (e.g., Hertzel and Officer (2012), Chava, Livdan, and Purnanandam (2009)).
Specifically, our regressions include the following firm characteristics as control variables:
firm size measured as the logarithm of total assets, a firm’s market-to-book ratio, return on
assets, leverage ratio, and asset tangibility. Cash flow volatility and stock return volatility
are computed using data over five years and 252 trading days prior to the loan origination
date. We also include a control variable that captures the likelihood that geographically
proximate firms enter financial distress after a local bankruptcy. This dummy variable is a
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forward looking measure of borrower quality. It is equal to one if a firm enters bankruptcy
during the three years following loan origination, and zero otherwise.
We also control for loan-specific characteristics in our regressions. Specifically, we include
the log of the loan’s deal amount and a dummy indicating the presence of financial covenants.
In addition, we control for whether the loan is secured and whether there is a sole or a
relationship lender, because the latter might lead to stronger contagion effects (Cai, Eidam,
Saunders, and Steffen (2018)). We also control for whether the loan contains a performance
pricing feature, and whether the base rate is prime.
Finally, we include a large set of fixed effects. To capture the impact of local and national
business cycles, we include state-year fixed effects in our regressions. These allow us to con-
trol for both observed and unobserved sources of common variation in loan spreads among
firms headquartered in the same state. As demonstrated by Gormley and Matsa (2014),
this approach is preferable to including state-level economic indicators as control variables,
since their inclusion can generate inconsistent coefficient estimates and is unlikely to con-
trol for unobservable determinants of risk premia. In particular, backward-looking economic
indicators are unlikely to capture the potentially important effect of lenders’ expectations
surrounding future state-level economic conditions. In addition to state-year fixed effects, we
include industry fixed effects to control for cross sectional differences in loan characteristics
across industries. Further, we include fixed effects for senior and non-senior debt ratings,
type of loan, and purpose of loan. Squared (continuous) control variables are also added in
one specification to allow for a non-linear impact of these variables.
To mitigate concerns that the borrower population may change after a local bankruptcy,
we add borrower fixed effects in one specification, thereby conditioning on within-borrower
variation (i.e., variation before and after a local bankruptcy) in loan spreads. Borrower fixed
effects additionally take care of the fact that local and non-local firms differ on various
dimensions (see Panel B of Table 2) that may not be entirely captured by our control
variables.
10
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2637026 
3.2 Local bankruptcies and loan spreads
Estimation results are reported in Panel A of Table 3. They suggest that loan spreads of
geographically proximate firms are adversely affected by a local bankruptcy. The point es-
timates of the coefficients suggest that loan spreads of firms that are located within a 50
kilometer county radius of a filing firm increase by 6−7 basis points the year following a
local bankruptcy filing. In column (1), we only include industry fixed effects, while we add
state-year fixed effects in column (2). In column (3), we also include fixed effects reflecting
senior debt ratings, types and purposes of loans. Borrower fixed effects are added in column
(4), and squared control variables are added in column (5). Across these regression specifi-
cations, our main result remains statistically significant at the 1% level.2 The result is also
economically significant. With an unconditional average loan spread of around 209.64 basis
points over LIBOR, our point estimates suggest that, controlling for loan, market, and bor-
rower characteristics, loan spreads of geographically proximate firms are about 3.4% higher
if a local firm has filed for bankruptcy in the previous year.3
With respect to our control variables, the signs of the coefficients are generally consistent
with earlier findings from the literature (e.g., Hertzel and Officer (2012), Chava, Livdan, and
Purnanandam (2009)). We find that loan spreads are significantly higher for borrowers that
are smaller, less profitable, and have higher cash flow and stock return volatility. At the same
time, spreads are higher for borrowers with low relative valuations (market-to-book ratio)
and higher pre-loan leverage. Smaller loans, re-financings, and loans that are tied to the U.S.
prime rate also have systematically higher spreads (despite the fact that Dealscan converts
non-LIBOR spreads into LIBOR-equivalent spreads). Spreads are also significantly higher
for secured loans, and lower for loans with a relationship lender, loans with a performance
pricing feature, and loans with covenants.
2In unreported results, we run our baseline regression separately for term loans and revolvers. As revolvers
are usually priced as to the risk of draw-down, we want to rule out that our main result is solely driven by
draw-down risk increasing after local bankruptcies. We find a significant increase of loan spreads for both,
term loans (coefficient 13.3, t-stat: 1.83) and revolvers (coefficient 9.0, t-stat: 4.29). Thus, an increase in
draw-down risk is unlikely to explain our main effect.
3Similar to results in Hertzel and Officer (2012) on industry bankruptcy waves, we find in untabulated
results that the average loan spread is the highest for loans originated in the middle of a local bankruptcy
wave.
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As expected, our measure of borrower quality is positively related to loan spreads. Spreads
are about 42 basis points higher if the borrower files for bankruptcy within three years
following loan origination. This result suggests that lenders are at least partly able to predict
greater credit risk and the probability of corporate bankruptcy. Since we still observe a
significant impact of location on loan spreads, changes in borrower quality and local, as well
as market-wide, economic conditions cannot fully explain the observed geographic contagion
effect.
In the next step, we conduct a matched sample analysis and compare local firms that
are in a different industry than the bankrupt firm to non-local firms in the same industry.
Specifically, we examine whether loan spreads of these firms are similar before the local
bankruptcy, and differ afterwards.
We define a treatment group which includes all loan packages originated from firms
located in a 50-km radius of a bankrupt firm, but that are neither in the same industry as
the bankrupt firm, nor belong to its supply chain. By doing this, we rule out that our results
are artefacts of the previously documented industry contagion effects (Hertzel and Officer
(2012)). To construct the control group, we employ a propensity score matching algorithm
to identify control firms that are not located in the same neighborhood but are in the same
industry of the treatment firms and, importantly, are comparable in other firm attributes
fundamental for loan spread determination. The matching variables at the firm level include
firm size, market to book ratio, return on assets, leverage ratio, asset tangibility, cash flow
volatility, and return volatility. We perform a nearest-neighbor propensity score matching
procedure (with no replacement) and require the differences between propensity scores of
the matched pairs to be less than 0.01.
After obtaining a matched sample from propensity score matching, to ensure the parallel
trend assumption is satisfied, we conduct a few diagnostic tests to ensure that the control
group is comparable to the treatment group. In Panel B of Table 3, we present the pre-
match propensity score and post-match diagnostic regressions. The dependent variable is
equal to one if a firm belongs to the treatment group, and zero otherwise. It is regressed on
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our firm-level control variables. We show that after matching, all independent variables are
statistically insignificant (column (2)), whereas in the pre-match sample (column (1)), all
control variables are statistically significant.
In Panel C, we compare treatment and control firms based on various firm characteris-
tics including the average amount and price of their loans. We find that while none of the
other observables in the post-match sample are statistically significant, loan spreads of the
treatment group are significantly higher than those of the control group. Furthermore, there
is also evidence that loan amounts are smaller for treated firms than for control firms. These
results are confirmed in a matching regression in Panel D, showing that loan spreads are
about 10.2bps higher for local firms after matching. These results support the view that lo-
cal bankruptcies adversely affect loan spreads of other local firms, even if these firms belong
to a different industry.4
Comparing the economic magnitude of our main result to that of other control variables,
an increase of 7-10 bps indicates that local bankruptcies have a similar impact on loan
spreads to cash flow volatility (a one standard deviation increase in cash flow volatility is
associated with an increase of 7.3 bps in loan spreads), but that they are economically more
important than, for example, asset tangibility (a one standard deviation increase in asset
tangibility is associated with a decrease of 3.33 bps in loan spreads). Furthermore, while our
results are economically smaller than those in Hertzel and Officer (2012), who report a 15-22
bps increase in loan spreads for firms in the same industry, they are comparable to findings
in Giannetti and Yafeh (2012), who find that a one-standard deviation increase in cultural
distance is associated with a 6.5 bps higher loan spread.
In Table 4, we investigate anticipation effects of lenders as well as the duration of ge-
ographic loan contagion. Specifically, we relate loan spreads to various leads and lags of
corporate bankruptcy events in addition to the standard control variables used in our base-
line specification in column (3) of Table 3. In brief, results show that the geographic contagion
effect is only temporary and our local bankruptcy indicator does not show any anticipation
4In unreported results, we examine whether our main result is different for Chapter 11 or Chapter 7
filings and find this not to be the case.
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effects. Therefore, we conjecture that the observed contagion effect is more likely the result
of lenders’ heightened sensitivity to the perceived potential for correlated financial distress
rather than being driven by a long-lasting deterioration in local economic conditions.
3.3 Local bankruptcies and other loan terms
In this section, we examine a broader set of loan characteristics that might be affected by
a local bankruptcy. In addition to increasing prices by adjusting loan spreads to perceived
increases in credit risk, lenders could also react to local bankruptcies by decreasing loan
volumes or maturities.
To test these conjectures, we re-estimate our baseline model from column (3) in Ta-
ble 3, and replace the dependent variable with coupon (defined as spread over LIBOR),
loan amount, and loan maturity, respectively. We also estimate two linear probability mod-
els where the dependent variables are indicators for whether a loan has covenants and for
whether a loan is secured, respectively.
Finally, we test whether an increase in loan spreads is offset by improved loan conditions
in other pricing terms. Berg, Saunders, and Steffen (2016) suggest that the fee structure is an
important part of the loan contract. For example, lenders use fees to price option-like features
embedded in the contract and private information on the likelihood of borrowers exercising
these options. Further, Berg, Saunders, Steffen, and Streitz (2017) provide evidence that
regional pricing differences in one of the pricing measures (for example, all-in-spread-drawn)
can be offset by other pricing terms (such as fees and all-in-spread-undrawn). Therefore, we
rerun our baseline specification from column (3) in Table (3) but use all-in-spread-undrawn
and upfront fees of a loan as dependent variables, respectively. The results of this analysis,
which is performed at the loan-level, are presented in Panel A of Table 5.
We find that lenders also tighten other lending terms for local borrowers the year after
a local firm files for bankruptcy. Results in column (1) suggest that coupons of geographi-
cally proximate firms significantly increase by about 7 basis points the year following a local
bankruptcy. While we do not observe that loan amounts go down after a local bankruptcy
(column (2)), the result in column (3) shows that local bankruptcies lead to a significant de-
14
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2637026 
crease in the maturity of loans extended to geographically proximate borrowers. Furthermore,
the estimates in columns (4) and (5) show that loans of firms in the vicinity of a bankruptcy
are more likely to have covenants and exhibit a higher likelihood of being secured in the
subsequent year.
Finally, in columns (6) and (7), we examine the impact of local bankruptcies on other
loan pricing terms, i.e., all-in-spread-undrawn and upfront fees. The number of observations
drops due to lower data availability of the dependent variables (all-in-spread-undrawn and
upfront fees). Consistent with our main result on loan spreads, we find that local firms face
higher all-in-spread-undrawn and upfront fees following a local bankruptcy event. Thus, loan
terms are not tightened on one pricing dimension while improving on others such that our
main result would be offset.
In Panel B of Table 5, we further examine whether loan volumes for a given firm drop
after a local bankruptcy. We estimate two regressions, where the dependent variables are the
natural logarithm of total loan amount at the firm-year level, or the number of loans at the
firm-year level, respectively. We include firm-level controls as well as industry and state-year
effects in these regressions. Results show that coefficients on the local bankruptcy variable are
negative, but not statistically significant. Thus, there is no evidence that borrowers receive
smaller loan volumes after a local bankruptcy. Rather, the impact of local bankruptcies on
access to debt capital seems to concentrate mostly on the pricing channel.
3.4 Robustness checks
In this section, we conduct robustness checks to confirm that (i) our results are not due to
selection effects (ii) our results are not simply an artefact of the well documented industry
contagion effects (Hertzel and Officer (2012), and (iii) our results remain robust to variations
of our main variable capturing local bankruptcies.
One concern with our findings may be that they are driven by a selection bias as the
sample of firms that borrow after a local bankruptcy could be “special”: On the one hand,
only firms with urgent financing needs might tap the market directly after a local bankruptcy.
This would result in an upward bias of our main effect. On the other hand, banks might be
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more selective after a local bankruptcy, only granting loans to high-quality firms after local
bankruptcies. This would lead to a downward bias. While some of these concerns should
already be mitigated given that our results obtain with borrower fixed effects and control for
local firm’s future bankruptcy propensities, there might still exist some unobservable factors
affecting firms’ creditworthiness that our control variables do not capture.
To address concerns regarding selection bias, in Table 6, we follow the approach in Altonji,
Elder, and Taber (2005) and examine selection bias on observables to infer the potential
impact of selection bias on unobservables in our sample. Specifically, we re-run our baseline
regression as in column (3) of Table 3, but remove two important control variables from
the regression: In column (1) of Table 6, we remove a firm’s return on assets, while we
remove asset tangibility in column (2). Finally, both variables are removed from the regression
reported in column (3). Since both variables, return on assets and asset tangibility, are
negatively related to loan spreads, and local firms (treated firms) have lower ROA and asset
tangibility than non-local firms (see Table 2), we expect the coefficient on local bankruptcies
to increase after removing these control variables.
Consistent with our expectations, coefficients in columns (1), (2), and (3) increase to 8.7,
8.2 and 9.1, respectively. Thus, they are higher than the one in our baseline estimation of
7.2. The difference, which ranges from 1.5 to 1.9, represents the relative explanatory power
of return on assets and asset tangibility for loan spreads. However, this difference is by far
less than the baseline effect of 7.2. This result suggests that any omitted variables would
need to be more important than return on assets or asset tangibility, or both, in order to
deplete the baseline effect to zero. In other words, in order to attribute the entire effect (i.e.,
7.2 bps) of local bankruptcy to selection bias, the effect of unobservables would need to be
3.78 times stronger than the effect of ROA or asset tangibility, which is highly unlikely.
A second concern regarding our findings may be that geographic contagion effects are
observed because industries tend to cluster geographically (e.g., IT firms cluster in Silicon
Valley). Therefore, in the next step, we ensure that our results do not merely reflect industry
contagion effects. These tests are motivated by the findings in Chava and Jarrow (2004), who
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show that industry effects are important for bankruptcy prediction. Furthermore, Hertzel
and Officer (2012) show that bankruptcies adversely affect other firms operating in the same
industry.
To account for industry effects, we add industry-year fixed effects to control for both
observable and unobservable sources of industry peers’ loan spreads. Alternatively, we re-
estimate our main regression after excluding all geographically proximate firms that operate
in the same industry as the firm filing for bankruptcy. Finally, we consider the effect of further
removing geographically proximate firms that operate in industries that are economically
connected to the firm filing for bankruptcy. To calculate the exposure of each industry to
all others, we use BEA Input-Output Accounts data to compute the Leontief inverse. This
approach, widely used in input-output analysis (e.g., ten Raa (2006)), accounts for both
primary and higher-order industry relationships in the supply chain. The results from these
tests are presented in Panel A of Table 7. The local bankruptcy variable is always statistically
significant at the 1% level and indicates that there is a 6 to 8.3 basis points increase in loan
spreads during the year following a local bankruptcy.
In our final set of robustness tests, we modify the definition of geographic proximity
and define local firms as all firms that are located in a 100 or 200 kilometers county radius
surrounding a filing firm, respectively. Then, we estimate our baseline regression from column
(3) in Table 3 and include these definitions of geographic proximity instead of, or in addition
to, our main local bankruptcy dummy variable. Results are reported in Table 8.
We continue to observe a positive contagion effect of about 4.6 basis points (column (1))
for firms that are located in a 100km county radius surrounding a filing firm, significant
at the 5% level. In contrast, the coefficient on the local bankruptcy indicator defined using
200km county radius is economically and statistically insignificant (column (3)). As expected,
the effect becomes economically weaker as the indicator includes firms that are located
progressively farther away from the filing firm.
In columns (2) and (4), we include our baseline bankruptcy indicator together with the
dummy variable reflecting the 100km radius (column (2)) and the 200km radius (column (4)).
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Our baseline bankruptcy indicator variable remains statistically and economically significant,
while the other two variables are not associated with any effect.
In column (5), we include our baseline bankruptcy indicator and interact it with an
indicator equal to one if the population density of the county is larger than the country
median in a given year. This is to ensure that our main result is not driven by heterogeneity
in population density. We find that, while the interaction term is insignificant, our baseline
result remains robust at 8.6 bps and highly statistically significant.5
Finally, in column (6), we redefine our radius of consideration depending on the firm’s
local population rank. Specifically, for each firm’s location, we classify its population rank,
ranking from one (most populated) to five (least populated). We then expand our geographic
circle for firms located in sparse areas. We leave the distance of consideration unchanged (i.e.
50 km) for firms with population rank of one and increase it by an incremental 25 km (i.e.
50% of the original distance) for each increase in density ranking from two to five. We still
observe an effect of 5 bps for this alternative measure of geographic proximity, which is
significant at the 10% level.
4 What drives geographic contagion of loan spreads?
There are mainly three alternative, but not mutually exclusive, explanations for geographic
contagion. First, local bankruptcies may signal deterioration in local economic conditions. If
local economic conditions cause firms in specific geographic areas to experience a simulta-
neous economic downturn, then the local bankruptcy would be a reflection of that economic
downturn and thus it would have no causal effect on geographically proximate firms. Deteri-
oration in credit conditions to local firms would be driven by informational contagion in this
scenario and an expectation that local firms’ creditworthiness will deteriorate in response to
the local bankruptcy.
5To further examine how the density of the local geographic market affects our main result, we re-run
our baseline regression from column (3), Panel A, Table 3, and interact the local bankruptcy dummy variable
with a variable capturing the size of the bankrupt firm relative to all other local firms. The interaction term
is insignificant, suggesting that our main result is not stronger if the filing firm is a larger part of the local
economy.
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Second, banks may suffer from a local bankruptcy shock and find their balance sheets to
be negatively affected. As a result, their ability to provide capital may be impaired.
Third, the geographic contagion effect that we document could be the result of lenders
adjusting credit conditions for all geographically proximate firms, regardless of their credit-
worthiness. Because of increased uncertainty regarding a particular geographic region, banks
may increase rates as a precautionary measure.6. If geographic information on bankruptcies
is expensive to gather, a temporary increase in loan spreads for all local firms may be more
efficient from the viewpoint of the bank than collecting more information about the local
bankruptcy. As a result, lenders may refrain from granting credit to otherwise healthy firms
in the same geographical area.
We perform several tests to determine whether and to what extent each of these potential
contagion effects contributes to our main result.
4.1 Information effects
In this section, we investigate the extent to which our results are driven by local economic
conditions that might affect the creditworthiness of firms operating in a certain geographic
area. For example, Benmelech, Bergman, Milanez, and Mukharlyamov (2018) show that
the liquidation of a retail chain weakens the economy in a given local area, because firms
with greater geographic exposure to bankrupt retailers are more likely to close stores in
affected areas. Therefore, we first examine whether our results obtain if we control for local
business cycles and whether local bankruptcies are associated with a deterioration of local
economic conditions. If capital markets anticipate a deterioration of local economic condi-
tions, we should observe prices for credit default swaps and for equity depreciate after a
local bankruptcy as well. Thus, we also examine changes in stock returns and CDS spreads
of local firms surrounding the event of a local bankruptcy.
In Panel A of Table 9, we investigate the extent to which our results are driven by local
economic conditions that might affect the creditworthiness of firms operating in a certain
6Precautionary motives of banks have also been shown to drive excess cash holdings of banks (Beccalli,
Chiaramonte, and Croci (2016))
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geographic area. In column (1), we directly control for time-varying economic conditions
at the county level. We obtain county-level business cycle measures from the U.S. Bureau
of Economic Analysis. In particular, we re-run our baseline regression from column (3) in
Table 3, and additionally control for the natural logarithm of the number of business estab-
lishments, population, and per capita income in each borrower’s headquarters vicinity. The
estimates in column (1) indicate that the local bankruptcy effect remains economically and
statistically significant in the presence of these additional county-level controls.
In column (2), we control for the number of economic centers in which each firm operates,
as well as its interaction with the local bankruptcy indicator. Following Garcia and Norli
(2012), we estimate each firm’s number of economic centers by tabulating the number of
states mentioned in firms’ 10-K filings using textual analysis. The estimates in column (2)
indicate that local firms with a larger number of economic centers experience lower loan
spreads following a local bankruptcy. Importantly, the local bankruptcy indicator continues
to load significantly even after controlling for variation in firms’ number of economic centers.
In column (3), we use an alternative measure of geographic diversification to control for
cross-sectional variation in local economic exposure. Specifically, we include an interaction
between the local bankruptcy indicator and an indicator for whether firms operate in indus-
tries that are classified as tradable by Mian and Sufi (2014). Less of the demand for products
of firms in tradable industries is likely to be concentrated in the local economy, and hence
these firms should exhibit a lower exposure to local economic conditions. Results in column
(3) show that loans spreads among firms in the tradable category do not react significantly
different to a local bankruptcy event.
In the next step, we examine whether local bankruptcies negatively affect local economic
conditions in terms of employment and the number of establishments in a given local area.
We obtain employment and county economic data from the Census on the number of estab-
lishments in a given county and county employment data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS). Then, we run county-level regressions of these local economic variables on our lagged
local bankruptcy dummy. We also include other proxies for local economic conditions such
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as income per capita, size of the working population, and the ratio of small or large firms
over total population. Importantly, we control for heterogeneity in economic policy and con-
ditions across states by including state-year fixed effects and county fixed effects. Results are
reported in Panel B of Table 9. They show that local bankruptcies do not significantly affect
future employment or the number of local establishments.7 This suggests that bankruptcy
events in our sample, on average, do not lead to a wide-spread local economic shock, and are
rather firm-specific distress events.
In Panel C of Table 9, we examine changes in local firms’ CDS spreads. We obtain CDS
data for the period of February 2001 to December 2013 from the Markit CDS database.8
Following prior studies (e.g., Jorion and Zhang (2007)), to keep uniformity in contracts, we
retain only senior unsecured CDS contracts denominated in USD with modified restructuring
clauses. This type of contract is the most liquid and constitutes the majority of the CDS
market. We start with the sample of local non-bankrupt firms from our baseline regression
that can be matched with the CRSP-Compustat linking table to obtain CUSIPs for these
firms. We then use the RED Entity data file to match CUSIPs with redcode, the main
identifier of Markit. Our final CDS sample, for a 21-day period starting 10 days before and
ending 10 days after the bankruptcy filing date, has 139,244 CDS observations, corresponding
to 1,006 bankruptcy events.9 Firms filing for bankruptcy are excluded from the sample.
To test for changes in credit risk of local firms around bankruptcy events, we apply the
standard event study method to the CDS spread. That is, we calculate local cumulative
abnormal CDS spread changes (CASCs) for a given time interval [t1, t2] as the abnormal
spread (AS) of the local portfolio for day t2 minus day t1.
10 Day t1 and t2 are the number of
7Results are also insignificant if we use the percentage change of establishments as dependent variable
(not reported).
8Following Ashcraft and Santos (2009), we exclude trading in January 2001, when the Markit data began,
because of data uncertainty regarding the starting dates of trading in these CDS contracts.
9This number of bankruptcy events is smaller than the 2,474 bankruptcies reported in Table 1 since we
lose observations due to matching CUSIPs and the availability of CDS data.
10We report results for rating-adjusted CDS spread as CDS spread varies by bond’s credit-rating. For
each firm j with rating r at time t, we compute ASjt= SjtIrt, where Sjt denotes the CDS spread of reference
entity j at day t and Irt is the equally weighted CDS index of rating r at day t. The index r refers to the
five rating categories including AAA/AA, A, BBB, BB, and B or below. For each filing event, cumulative
abnormal CDS spread changes (CASCs) are calculated as CASCt1−t2=ASjt2-ASjt1 .
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days relative to the filing date. Results in Panel C show that CDS spreads do not significantly
change for a two-day event window and for a five-day event window surrounding a local
bankruptcy. Further, we even observe a marginally significant decrease in CDS spreads if the
event window is increased to ten days.
In Panel D, we examine whether local firms’ stock returns change in response to a local
bankruptcy.11 We again employ a standard event-study methodology, using the Fama-French
three factor model to calculate abnormal returns. Our event date is the announcement date.
The three factor parameters are estimated based on the period from trading days -252 to
-21, where day 0 is the bankruptcy filing date. Firms filing for bankruptcy are excluded from
the sample. After estimating cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for the event window of
individual local firms, we calculate value-weighted average CARs of all local stocks for each
bankruptcy event. We finally compute the average abnormal return of all local portfolios.
Results in Panel D show that stock returns of other local firms do not significantly react to
a local bankruptcy. Across all event windows that we examine, we do not observe significant
CARs. These results cast further doubt on an information contagion effect explaining our
main result.12
In our next set of tests, we examine whether increased loan spreads are economically
justified by higher actual default risks among local firms following a local default event. If
this is the mechanism driving our results, we expect to observe a subsequent increase in the
likelihood of financial distress among surviving local firms.
In Panel A of Table 10, we regress several proxies of default risk on the local bankruptcy
indicator.13 In column (1), the dependent variable is a default indicator that equals one if a
11To obtain the stock price data for non-bankrupt local firms, we link the CRSP and COMPUSTAT
datasets using the CCM CRSP/Compustat Merged-Fundamentals Annual file with link types of “LC”,
“LU”, and “LS”. We restrict the sample to stocks that are traded on NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ and
common stocks with share code, as indicated in CRSP, of 10 or 11. We use return data that is corrected for
splits and dividends and winsorize daily returns of all CRSP stocks at the first and 99th percentile.
12In unreported results, we examine whether stock returns of firms associated with higher information
asymmetries, for example younger firms or firms in rural areas, exhibit a stronger reaction to local bankrupt-
cies than stock returns of firms associated with lower information asymmetries, but do not find this to be
the case.
13Note that, as Dealscan only includes data on new loans for a given year, the sample includes only those
surviving local firms that took out loans in the year following the bankruptcy.
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firm’s debt is rated either “D” or “SD”, and zero otherwise. In column (2), the dependent
variable is a downgrade indicator that equals one if a firm experiences a downgrade in its
debt rating in a given year, and zero otherwise. In column (3), the dependent variable is a
forward-looking indicator of a firm’s eventual bankruptcy that equals one if the borrower
files for bankruptcy within three years of the loan origination date, and zero otherwise. In
column (4), we modify the forward-looking indicator of a firm’s eventual bankruptcy to
match the average value weighted maturity of all loans of a given borrower.14 To control for
industry and state heterogeneity and macroeconomic conditions, we also include industry
and combined state-year fixed effects in all regressions. Regressions are run at the borrower
level. Across all specifications, we find that the local bankruptcy indicator is statistically
insignificant.
In Panel B of Table 10, we examine whether a collateral channel as in Benmelech and
Bergman (2011) can explain our main result. Specifically, loan spreads of local firms might
increase because local collateral loses value. For example, even for a firm in the tradable
sector, collateral is likely to be local (such as the firm’s headquarters), making loan spreads
justifiably larger after local bankruptcies. If this was the case, we expect our main result
would be concentrated among loans that require collateral. In other words, the effect should
be weaker or even non-existent for unsecured loans or revolver loans. In Panel B of Table
10, we run two additional regressions on subsamples of unsecured loans and revolver loans,
respectively. Regressions are run at the loan level. We observe a significant impact of local
bankruptcy events on both unsecured and revolver loans. The effect is also economically
significant and ranges between 7.2 and 9 basis points. This renders a collateral channel
unlikely as a major explanation for our main result.
Finally, in Panel C of Table 10, we investigate the impact of local bankruptcies on a
firm’s propensity of technical default. Following the previous literature (e.g., Franz, Hass-
abElnaby, and Lobo (2014), Denis and Wang (2014), and Chava, Nanda, and Xiao (2017)),
14Given that the average maturity of a loan in our sample is roughly 5 years (see Table 2), looking at firms’
bankruptcy propensity based on local bankruptcies in the previous year may lead to an underestimation of
the effect. Therefore, we first compute the average value weighted maturity for each borrower and then assign
the dependent variable a value equal to one if the firm files for bankruptcy within this time period.
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we define technical default as the proximity between firms’ actual ratios and their cor-
responding contractual covenants. In particular, we consider the most commonly adopted
financial covenants, including minimum interest coverage, current ratio, and maximum debt
to cash flow. For interest coverage and current ratios, the higher the distance, the stronger a
firm’s financial health. For the debt to cash flow ratio, we expect financially healthy firms to
have lower positive distance. Regressions are run at the borrower-level and include the same
set of firm-specific control variables as before, except that we exclude a firm’s bankruptcy
propensity, which is of course highly correlated with technical default. For all three proxies
of technical default, we do not find any evidence that there is an increase due to a local
bankruptcy.
Next, we consider the incidence of covenant violation of local firms following a bankruptcy
event. We borrow the data on covenant violation from Nini, Smith, and Sufi (2012). They
adopt a text-search algorithm on quarterly and annual SEC filings reported by Edgar to
construct a data set on financial covenant violations of Compustat firms. Based on these
data, we create an indicator that equals one if there is a reported violation in a given year,
and zero otherwise to perform a linear probability regression on covenant violations. The
result in column (4) shows that the coefficient on local bankruptcies is not statistically
significant.
Taken together, we conclude that information effects are unlikely to be the main driver of
our results. We neither observe a deterioration in local economic conditions, nor an increased
default risk of local borrowers after a local bankruptcy.
4.2 The bank balance sheet channel
Prior literature shows that lenders experiencing defaults subsequently write more restrictive
loan contracts (e.g., Gan (2007), Khwaja and Mian (2008), and Chava and Purnanandam
(2011)). This finding suggests that our main result may be driven by lenders whose balance
sheets have been adversely affected by local corporate bankruptcies. To examine whether the
observed restrictive loan pricing is explained by lenders’ impaired ability to provide loans,
we consider subsamples of banks that do not lend to local bankrupt firms or belong to the
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top 30 largest banks, as reported by the Federal Reserve Board. These banks’ balance sheets
are less likely to be affected by a local bankruptcy. If the bank balance sheet channel is
at work, the effect of local bankruptcy would become indistinguishable from zero for this
subset of lenders. However, results in columns (1) and (2) of Table 11 still show a significant
increase in loan spreads from lenders with no bankruptcy exposure and lenders belonging to
the top 30 largest banks. The effect remains economically meaningful at 7.3bps and 5.8bps,
respectively. This finding casts doubt on the view that local contagion is due to lenders’
balance sheets being adversely affected by local bankruptcies.
In addition, we evaluate the role of lender financial health on the observed baseline effect.
First, we assess the degree of local banking market competition. We argue that banks under
competitive pressure are less likely to increase loan spreads after a local bankruptcy. We
compute the local Herfindahl index (HHI), which is equal to the sum of squared market
shares of all lenders (lead arrangers) that lend to local firms. The higher the HHI index, the
more concentrated the local banking market. We define an indicator variable that is equal
to one if the local HHI is higher than the median HHI of all lenders in a given year, and zero
otherwise. We interact lender concentration with our local bankruptcy variable and present
the result in column (3). The interaction effect is positive and significant, showing that the
effect is, in fact, stronger for lenders operating in a concentrated market.
Next, we take into account lenders’ financial capability by looking into lender profitability
and equity capital ratio. In order to obtain financial information of lenders, we first identify
lead arrangers of all facilities in our sample as the lenders of interest since these institutions
are responsible to negotiate contract terms, as well as monitor and enforce covenant compli-
ance. To identify lead arrangers, we rely on Dealscan’s lender role variable and classify lead
arrangers following the approach of Gatev and Strahan (2009). We hand-match the names
of Dealscan lenders with the names of bank subsidiaries and bank holding companies from
the National Information Center (NIC) website. We then convert bank subsidiaries to bank
holding companies using the Relationship data from NIC. From this matching, we are able
to obtain bank RSSDIDs which allow us to retrieve financial data of banks at the time of
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loan origination. In our final dataset, we are able to match 440 lenders from Dealscan for
11,760 loan facilities.
The results reported in columns (4) and (5) show that our main effect is not driven
by poorly performing banks, measured by EBITDA over total assets, or under-capitalized
banks, proxied by shareholder’s equity over total assets. In fact, the interaction effect between
local bankruptcy and lender profitability is positive and significant, suggesting that banks
profitably charge borrowers higher rates after a local bankruptcy event.
Collectively, results in Table 11 lend little support that our main result is driven by local
banks with impaired balance sheets lending less and increasing spreads. In fact, we find that
banks that are profitable and enjoy monopoly benefits, are more likely to raise loan pricing
for local firms.
4.3 Risk-based contagion due to information opacity
If a local firm files for bankruptcy, loan spread contagion may also occur because of increased
uncertainty in the local lending market. Since the process of information collection and moni-
toring is costly, especially for uninformed lenders, they may either charge higher loan spreads
if uncertainty increases to compensate for moral hazard and agency problems (Holmstro¨m
and Tirole (1997) and Holmstro¨m (1979)), or retreat from the market completely. The liter-
ature has used the term “flight-to-home” effect to describe this phenomenon. For example,
Giannetti and Laeven (2012) show that under the presence of an adverse economic shock,
lenders allocate their capital in favor of domestic borrowers. De Haas and Van Horen (2013)
document that during the financial crisis, banks did not contract credit uniformly, instead
they continued lending in geographically close countries or in countries where they operated
a network of domestic co-lenders.
To examine this potential channel, we begin by testing whether our main result is stronger
for bankruptcies that should lead to higher uncertainty in the local lending market. Results
are presented in columns (1) and (2) of Panel A in Table 12. In column (1), we interact
the local bankruptcy indicator with news coverage of the local bankruptcy. We measure
news coverage as the number of news articles mentioning the bankrupt firm in the year of
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announcement. Following prior literature on U.S. newspaper coverage (e.g., Fang and Peress
(2009), Niessner and So (2017)), we focus on articles in the Wall Street Journal, New York
Times, USA Today, and Washington Post. While the baseline effect of news coverage on
loan spreads is significantly positive, indicating that large bankruptcies, which likely gain
more media attention, have a stronger impact on average loan spreads in our sample, the
interaction effect of news coverage and our local bankruptcy dummy is significantly negative.
This indicates that the contagion effect on loan spreads of other local firms weakens for
bankruptcies with more news coverage and thus greater transparency. In column (2), we
interact our local bankruptcy variable with the bankrupt firm’s intangible asset ratio. We
conjecture that bankruptcies of firms with high intangibility ratios should be characterized
by higher information asymmetries. We find that our main result is indeed stronger for
bankruptcies of firms with many intangible assets. Based on these tests, we conclude that
our main result is concentrated among bankruptcies that increase uncertainty in the local
lending market.
If uncertainty in the local lending market is the driver of increased loan spreads, then
borrowers that are associated with higher information asymmetries should be particularly
affected. To test this conjecture, we interact our local bankruptcy indicator with borrowers’
age and with an indicator reflecting whether a borrower is located in an urban or a rural
area. We argue that lenders should find it easier to collect information about firms that are
older and located in urban areas. Results are presented in columns (3) and (4) of Panel A in
Table 12. We find that our main result is indeed stronger for borrowers that are associated
with higher information asymmetries, i.e. younger firms and firms located in rural areas.
This evidence lends further support to our hypothesis that lenders charge higher interest
rates when local bankruptcies are characterized by more information asymmetry (Ivashina
(2009), Roberts (2015), and Sufi (2007)).
Taken together, our results in Panel A support the view that lenders may increase rates to
local firms because of increased uncertainty regarding the reasons behind a local bankruptcy
as well as high informational asymmetries between local firms and themselves.
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Importantly, we do not expect all lenders to react uniformly to increased uncertainty in
the local credit market. In particular, we conjecture that local lenders and relationship lenders
should find it much easier to overcome increased uncertainty and information asymmetries
arising from a local bankruptcy. According to the flight-to-home effect, we would expect
lenders with intensive local business networks to allocate their capital in favor of domestic
borrowers after a local bankruptcy (Giannetti and Laeven (2012) and De Haas and Van Horen
(2013)). Thus, our main effect should be weaker for lenders with a high local market share
and a smaller branch network.
We proxy for lenders’ local exposure by their local market share and the size of their local
branch network. Local market share is calculated based on lenders’ relative lending amount
to local firms. Bank branch network is obtained from the Summary of Deposit (SOD) of
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation website (FDIC). The FDIC provides detailed
information from their annual surveys of branch offices for all FDIC-insured institutions.
Data are available from 1994 on. These branch-level network data include information such
as, but not limited to, the amount of deposits, physical address, the branch’s latitude and
longitude, type of branch service, and (RSSD) identifiers of bank holding companies. We
restrict our sample to branches that are classified as Full Service, brick and mortar office.15
Results are presented in columns (1) and (2) of Panel B, where we interact the local
bankruptcy indicator with lenders’ local market share and the size of their branch network,
respectively. The results show that our baseline effect is stronger for lenders with limited
local market share and a large branch network. This is in line with the flight-to-home effect
reported in Giannetti and Laeven (2012) and De Haas and Van Horen (2013). Local lenders
may have informational advantages that are particularly valuable to overcome increased
uncertainty after a local bankruptcy. As a result, they are less likely to increase loan spreads
to other local firms.
In columns (3) and (4) of Panel B, we examine whether our main result is weaker for
relationship lenders. These lenders should be better able to overcome informational asym-
15Other reported types of branches include those that offer limited services such as retail offices, home
banking, and drive-through facilities.
28
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2637026 
metries, particularly after a local bankruptcy (Bolton, Freixas, Gambacorta, and Mistrulli
(2016) and Beck, Degryse, Haas, and van Horen (2018)). We define a loan as being issued by
a relationship lender when the borrower has another loan from the same lead arranger in the
three years prior to the loan origination (and zero otherwise).16 Consistent with our expecta-
tion, we only observe a positive and significant effect for deals with transaction lenders. The
magnitude of the effect for deals with relationship lenders is substantially smaller and not
statistically significant. Our results support the views of Bolton, Freixas, Gambacorta, and
Mistrulli (2016) and Beck, Degryse, Haas, and van Horen (2018), who argue that relationship
lending is particularly beneficial for borrowers in adverse economic conditions.
In contrast to relationship lenders’ behavior, we seem to observe a flight-to-home effect
by transaction lenders. In addition to increasing rates after a local bankruptcy (column (4),
Panel B of Table 12), we also observe that the market composition of relationship lenders vs.
transaction lenders changes after a local bankruptcy. Before a local bankruptcy, the fraction
of relationship loans is 32.6%. After a local bankruptcy, this fraction increases to 35.5%
(t-stat: 2.43), suggesting that a subset of transaction lenders retreat from the local credit
market completely.
Taken together, our findings in this section support the view that increased informational
asymmetry between borrowers and lenders after a local bankruptcy lead to risk-based con-
tagion, whereby lenders increase loan spreads for surviving local firms. However, the effect
is significantly mitigated for local lenders and relationship lenders, supporting the ’flight-to-
home’ and relationship lending hypotheses.
One final question arising from our previous findings is why otherwise healthy local
firms accept higher loan spreads after a local bankruptcy. In the absence of informational or
competitive frictions, they could simply switch banks if lenders raise rates. However, firms
are not always able to do so because of, for example, high switching costs. According to Kim,
Kliger, and Vale (2003), average switching costs amount to 4.1%, which is about one-third of
the market average interest rate on loans. Thus, from a borrower’s perspective, a temporary
16This relationship lender indicator is also included as a control variable in our main regressions.
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increase in loan spreads may still be cheaper than switching to a new lender. In line with this
view, we find that our main result is stronger if the local banking market is concentrated (see
column (3) in Table 11) and if the borrower is younger and located in a rural area (columns
(3) and (4) in Table 12). For these borrowers, it should be more costly to switch lenders
because of higher information asymmetries.
5 Conclusion
This paper explores whether local bankruptcies adversely affect credit conditions for geo-
graphically proximate firms. Our results suggest that loan spreads of geographically prox-
imate firms increase by about 7 basis points during the year following a local bankruptcy.
This effect lasts for about one year and does not seem to be anticipated by lenders. We do
not find evidence that the increase in loan spreads is driven by deteriorating local economic
conditions or creditworthiness of local firms. Rather, it seems to be driven by informational
asymmetries between borrowers and lenders, resulting in a transitory increase in loan spreads
for all local firms, perhaps as a precautionary measure by banks who find it too costly to
gather further local information. In line with this view, we find that our results are weaker
for local lenders and relationship lenders.
Our results may be interesting to policy makers, as they suggest a new geographic channel
through which bankruptcy shocks are transmitted by financial intermediaries. In particular,
as the proportion of loan originations shifts toward large lenders with limited local informa-
tion, our results suggest that idiosyncratic shocks that lead to otherwise benign bankruptcies
have the potential to propagate across firms in the local market.
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Table 1: Loans and filings by year and county
Panel A of this table shows the number of corporate loans from DealScan in each year of our sample
(column (1)) and the number of bankruptcy filings from Bankruptcy Research Database and New
Generation Research in each year of our sample (column (2)). The sample period is from 1990
to 2013. To be included in the loan sample, a borrower needs to be included in the Compustat
database and must not have missing county information. The largest tranche is chosen for each
deal from Dealscan. In column (1), “Year” refers to the time when a loan is originated for the loan
sample. In column (2), “Year” refers to the number of bankruptcy filings in a given year. Panel B of
this table shows the fraction of bankruptcies for the top 20 counties where most of the bankruptcies
occur. It is computed as the number of bankruptcies in a given county divided by the number of
all bankruptcy filings.
Panel A: Bankruptcies by year
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Table 1: cont’d
Panel B: Bankruptcies by county
Rank State County Percentage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1 NY New York County 5.54%
2 CA Los Angeles County 4.00%
3 TX Dallas County 3.80%
4 TX Harris County 3.52%
5 IL Cook County 3.23%
6 CA Santa Clara County 2.34%
7 CA Orange County 2.30%
8 CA San Diego County 1.74%
9 FL Miami-Dade County 1.62%
10 MA Middlesex County 1.54%
11 FL Palm Beach County 1.49%
12 FL Broward County 1.41%
13 AZ Maricopa County 1.29%
14 NV Clark County 1.29%
15 CT Fairfield County 1.25%
16 CA Alameda County 1.17%
17 VA Fairfax County 1.09%
18 WA King County 1.01%
19 MN Hennepin County 0.97%
20 CA San Francisco County 0.93%
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Table 2: Summary statistics and univariate differences
Panel A of this table presents summary statistics at the loan- and firm-level, respectively. Panel B
of this table presents univariate differences between local firms (i.e., firms located in a 50 kilometers
county-radius surrounding a corporate bankruptcy event) and non-local firms (i.e., all firms located
outside this radius), respectively.
Panel A: Summary statistics
Observations Mean Median Std. Dev.
Loan characteristics
Spread 14,040 209.64 200.00 127.80
Coupon 14,040 205.84 200.00 126.58
Loan amount (in billion USD) 14,040 0.31 0.12 0.55
Maturity (in month) 13,810 45.21 48.00 22.70
Covenants 14,040 0.70 1.00 0.46
Secured loan 14,040 0.72 1.00 0.45
Sole lender 14,040 0.32 0.00 0.47
Base is prime 14,040 0.85 1.00 0.36
Relationship lender 14,040 0.39 0.00 0.49
Performance pricing 14,040 0.53 1.00 0.50
Refinancing 14,040 0.64 1.00 0.48
All-in-undrawn 9,418 31.14 25.00 17.47
Upfront fee 3,816 50.51 28.59 57.46
Revolver 10,522 0.78 1.00 0.41
Firm characteristics
Firm size 14,040 6.22 6.19 1.88
Market to book ratio 14,040 1.68 1.38 1.01
Returns on assets 14,040 0.11 0.12 0.12
Leverage ratio 14,040 0.31 0.29 0.22
Asset tangibility 14,040 0.31 0.24 0.24
Cashflow volatility 14,040 0.09 0.05 0.13
Return volatility 14,040 0.03 0.03 0.02
Bankruptcy propensity 14,040 0.01 0.00 0.11
CDS spread 21,780 186 82 354
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Table 2: cont’d
Panel B: Differences between local and non-local firms
Local firms Non-local firms Difference t-stat.
Loan characteristics
Spread 215.200 197.850 17.350*** 7.69
Coupon 211.340 194.210 17.131*** 7.66
Loan amount 0.321 0.315 0.007 0.69
Maturity 44.091 46.980 -2.888*** -7.24
Covenant 0.713 0.704 0.009 0.99
Secured loans 0.735 0.695 0.040*** 4.94
Sole lender 0.326 0.292 0.034*** 4.01
Relationship lender 0.372 0.416 -0.044*** -5.13
Performance pricing 0.523 0.553 -0.029*** -3.28
Refinancing 0.641 0.649 -0.008 -1.05
All-in-undrawn 32.141 29.498 2.643*** 6.703
Upfront fee 52.584 46.870 5.714*** 2.514
Revolver 0.780 0.789 -0.009 -1.114
Firm characteristics
Firm size 6.248 6.233 0.015 0.58
Market to book ratio 1.689 1.663 0.026 1.43
Return on assets 0.105 0.124 -0.019*** -9.41
Leverage ratio 0.307 0.313 -0.006 -1.43
Asset tangibility 0.289 0.340 -0.051*** -12.32
Cashflow volatility 0.100 0.083 0.017*** 7.18
Return volatility 0.033 0.030 0.003*** 10.52
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Table 3: Local bankruptcies and loan spreads of geographically proximate firms
Panel A of this table presents estimates from regressions of firms’ loan all-in-drawn spreads (which
equals spread + annual fee) on a dummy variable which is equal to one if a local firm filed for
bankruptcy in the previous year, and zero otherwise. All explanatory variables are defined in detail
in Appendix A. The sample period is from 1990 to 2013. Standard errors are clustered by borrower
level. Panel B presents results from probit regressions where the dependent variable is equal to one
if a firm belongs to the treatment group (i.e., all local firms that belong to a different industry
and supply chain than the bankrupt firm), and zero if a firm belongs to the control group (i.e.,
all non-local firms that belong to the same industry than the local non-bankrupt firms). The pre-
match sample includes all treated and control firms before nearest neighbor matching is applied.
The post-match sample only includes treated firms and their nearest neighbor. Matching variables
include firm size, market to book ratio, return on assets, leverage ratio, asset tangibility, cash flow
volatility and return volatility. All regressions include industry fixed effects. In Panel C, differences
in means between treated firms and their nearest neighbors (i.e., control firms) are reported. Panel
D presents estimates from regressions of firms’ all-in-drawn spreads (column (1)), coupon (column
(2)), all-in-undrawn (column (3)), up-front fee (column (4)), loan amount (column (5)), maturity
(column (6)), covenant (column (7)), security (column (8)) on a dummy variable indicating a
local bankruptcy in the previous year. The sample includes treated and nearest neighbor matched
firms. All regressions include senior debt rating, loan type and loan purpose fixed effects. Standard
errors are clustered by borrower level. t-statistics are provided in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate
significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.
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Table 3: cont’d
Panel A: Fixed effects Industry FE Industry & Industry, state-year & Industry, state-year, Industry, state-year,
regressions state-year FE loan type FE loan type & loan type FE &
borrower FE squared controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Local bankruptcyt−1 7.203*** 5.948*** 7.216*** 6.213*** 7.145***
(3.94) (2.70) (3.42) (2.97) (3.40)
Firm size -1.853 -6.833*** -9.794*** -14.60*** -28.182***
(-1.53) (-5.53) (-7.38) (-9.11) (-6.58)
Market to book ratio -9.348*** -8.599*** -8.000*** -8.251*** -18.175***
(-8.81) (-8.11) (-7.87) (-6.51) (-6.16)
Return on Assets -101.947*** -108.238*** -116.224*** -125.1*** -107.696***
(-9.98) (-10.66) (-11.81) (-9.30) (-11.03)
Leverage ratio 90.449*** 106.026*** 72.590*** 85.55*** 112.756***
(16.05) (18.53) (12.74) (11.45) (9.65)
Asset tangibility -12.284** -16.129*** -8.990 -13.89 -7.667
(-2.04) (-2.78) (-1.63) (-1.45) (-0.49)
Cashflow volatility 56.489*** 44.964*** 42.506*** 60.66*** 45.129***
(6.29) (5.18) (5.10) (3.71) (5.46)
Return volatility 1,655.248*** 1,470.313*** 1,561.543*** 1440.4*** 2,864.419***
(22.79) (19.04) (21.06) (17.80) (13.34)
Bankruptcy propensity 39.303*** 39.294*** 41.941*** 47.72*** 45.773***
(4.04) (4.22) (4.77) (3.99) (5.25)
Deal Amount -9.483*** -9.052*** -9.093*** -8.621*** 11.764
(-6.61) (-6.34) (-6.58) (-6.72) (0.87)
Financial covenant 1.198 -4.588 -4.701* -6.178** -4.644*
(0.48) (-1.60) (-1.75) (-2.47) (-1.73)
Secured loan 74.678*** 67.327*** 56.713*** 30.26*** 53.482***
(33.80) (30.14) (26.62) (13.59) (24.62)
Sole lender 1.176 2.622 2.263 1.040 0.292
(0.39) (0.86) (0.78) (0.38) (0.10)
Base is prime -2.890 7.335** 9.717*** 13.88*** 10.812***
(-0.92) (2.20) (3.07) (5.09) (3.43)
Relationship lender -6.995*** -4.242** -4.092** -4.356*** -3.691**
(-4.11) (-2.44) (-2.50) (-3.10) (-2.27)
Performance pricing -38.455*** -37.313*** -28.920*** -23.53*** -29.104***
(-15.86) (-14.82) (-12.47) (-10.41) (-12.53)
Refinancing 6.460*** -2.328 8.208*** 2.884 7.682***
(3.14) (-1.10) (3.34) (1.37) (3.14)
Observations 14,040 14,040 14,040 12,804 14,040
Adjusted R2 0.468 0.540 0.577 0.661 0.582
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-yr FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Borrower FE No No No Yes No
Senior debt rating FE No No Yes Yes Yes
Type of loan FE No No Yes Yes Yes
Purpose of loan FE No No Yes Yes Yes
Squared control variables No No No No Yes
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Table 3: cont’d
Panel B: Propensity Score Matching
Pre-match Post-match
(1) (2)
Firm size 0.02*** -0.0008
(8.29) (-0.15)
Market to book ratio 0.02*** 0.004
(3.27) (0.37)
Return on Assets -0.1** -0.05
(-2.27) (-0.56)
Leverage ratio 0.08*** -0.006
(3.41) (-0.14)
Asset tangibility -0.2*** -0.008
(-9.00) (-0.19)
Cashflow volatility 0.2*** 0.1
(3.74) (1.59)
Return volatility 0.6* -0.08
(1.67) (-0.13)
Industry FE Yes Yes
Observations 11,424 4,773
Adjusted R2 0.042 0.001
Panel C: Differences between treatment and matched control group
Treated Control Difference t-stat p-value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Loan spread 182.990 173.780 9.210 2.670*** 0.008
Log of deal Amount 18.489 18.575 -0.086 -1.920* 0.055
Firm size 6.495 6.555 -0.060 -1.180 0.237
Market to book ratio 1.609 1.611 -0.002 -0.100 0.920
Return on Assets 0.124 0.126 -0.002 -0.600 0.552
Leverage ratio 0.311 0.314 -0.003 -0.520 0.600
Asset tangibility 0.331 0.327 0.004 0.600 0.548
Cashflow volatility 0.069 0.066 0.003 1.210 0.228
Return volatility 0.029 0.028 0.001 1.240 0.216
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Table 3: cont’d
Panel D: Matching regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Spread Coupon All in undrawn Up-front fee Loan amount Maturity Covenant Secured
Local bankruptcyt−1 10.5*** 10.9*** 1.5** 8.6*** -0.01 -1.0* -0.009 0.005
(2.83) (2.96) (2.02) (3.13) (-0.19) (-1.96) (-0.55) (0.23)
Senior debt rating FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Type of loan FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Purpose of loan FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5,226 5,226 3,635 1,437 5,226 5,139 5,226 5,226
Adjusted R2 0.15 0.16 0.06 0.06 0.39 0.37 0.06 0.10
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Table 4: Local bankruptcies and loan spreads: Lead and lag effects
This table presents estimates from regressions of firms’ loan all-in-drawn spreads (which equals
spread + annual fee) on a dummy variable which is equal to one if a local firm filed for bankruptcy
in the previous year, and zero otherwise. In column (1), we include dummy variables for local
bankruptcies in the current, and in the previous year. In column (2), we additionally include a
dummy variable for local bankruptcies in the subsequent year. In column (3), we also include a
dummy variable for local bankruptcies two years ago. The regression specification is the same as
in Table 3, column (3). All explanatory variables are defined in detail in Appendix A. Standard
errors are clustered by borrower level. t-statistics are provided in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate




Local bankruptcyt−1 5.242** 5.141** 4.737**
(2.21) (2.16) (1.96)
Local bankruptcyt 3.919 3.679 3.007
(1.46) (1.34) (1.08)
Local bankruptcyt+1 0.746 0.185
(0.31) (0.07)
Observations 14,040 14,040 14,040
Adjusted R2 0.579 0.579 0.579
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
State-yr FE Yes Yes Yes
Senior debt rating FE Yes Yes Yes
Type of loan FE Yes Yes Yes
Purpose of loan FE Yes Yes Yes
Control variables Yes Yes Yes
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Table 5: Local bankruptcies and other loan terms
Panel A, columns (1) to (3) present estimates from regressions of firms’ coupon, defined as spread
over LIBOR, (column (1)), loan amount (column (2)), or loan maturity (column (3)) on a dummy
variable indicating a local bankruptcy in the previous year. In column (4), the dependent variable
is equal to one if loan covenants are present, and zero otherwise. In column (5), the dependent
variable is equal to one for secured loans, and zero otherwise. In column (6) (column (7)), the
dependent variable is all-in-spread-undrawn (upfront fees). The regression specification is the same
as in Table 3, column (3), and regressions are run at the loan-level. In Panel B, the dependent
variables of columns (1) and (2) are the natural logarithm of total loan amount and the number
of loans at the firm-year level, respectively. All regressions include industry and state-year fixed
effects. All explanatory variables are defined in detail in Appendix A. Standard errors are clustered
by borrower level. t-statistics are provided in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1,
5, and 10 percent level, respectively.
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Table 5: cont’d
Panel A: Loan-level Coupon Loan Maturity Covenant Secured All-in-spread Upfront
amount loan undrawn fee
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Local bankruptcyt−1 7.080*** -0.008 -0.669* 0.015* 0.022** 1.5*** 4.3*
(3.41) (-0.45) (-1.66) (1.84) (2.43) (3.55) (1.68)
Firm size -9.952*** 0.631*** -2.099*** -0.020*** -0.104*** 0.2 2.3
(-7.65) (83.90) (-8.42) (-3.94) (-18.61) (0.73) (1.61)
Market to book ratio -7.894*** 0.026*** -0.062 -0.003 -0.046*** -0.7*** -0.8
(-8.09) (3.42) (-0.37) (-0.89) (-11.21) (-3.15) (-0.81)
Return on Assets -110.777*** 0.293*** 5.692*** 0.238*** -0.234*** -16.1*** -22.4***
(-11.61) (4.33) (3.74) (7.14) (-7.33) (-6.63) (-2.85)
Leverage ratio 73.360*** 0.415*** 4.905*** -0.024 0.318*** 10.8*** 29.9***
(13.10) (9.04) (4.68) (-1.29) (15.75) (9.56) (4.97)
Asset tangibility -8.879* -0.093** 2.528** -0.036* -0.047* 2.5** 1.8
(-1.66) (-2.05) (2.44) (-1.88) (-1.83) (2.11) (0.28)
Cashflow volatility 40.496*** -0.020 -3.177** 0.034 0.118*** 4.7** 20.1**
(5.01) (-0.31) (-2.37) (1.10) (4.12) (2.43) (2.52)
Return volatility 1,521.332*** -2.101*** -100.934*** -0.528** 2.630*** 161.4*** 518.6***
(21.21) (-4.06) (-8.01) (-2.15) (10.72) (10.06) (6.70)
Bankruptcy propensity 38.784*** 0.065 -3.942*** -0.013 -0.005 2.7 -4.4
(4.57) (1.11) (-2.86) (-0.46) (-0.20) (1.35) (-0.57)
Deal Amount -9.134*** 4.338*** 0.017*** -0.007 -2.5*** -2.5
(-6.77) (16.15) (3.25) (-1.27) (-8.43) (-1.58)
Financial covenant -4.098 0.067*** 0.224 -0.021** -0.3 -11.5***
(-1.57) (3.25) (0.46) (-2.11) (-0.64) (-3.89)
Secured loan 58.768*** -0.023 1.727*** -0.018** 10.9*** 16.4***
(27.79) (-1.27) (3.89) (-2.11) (24.87) (6.37)
Sole lender 2.828 -0.745*** -2.962*** -0.027*** -0.040*** -4.7*** 0.3
(1.00) (-33.79) (-5.59) (-2.66) (-3.77) (-8.51) (0.10)
Base is prime 9.598*** -0.092*** -2.160*** 0.254*** -0.008 0.04 -2.8
(3.11) (-3.98) (-3.90) (18.68) (-0.66) (0.06) (-0.88)
Relationship lender -3.989** 0.052*** -1.613*** 0.003 0.012* -0.5 -10.6***
(-2.48) (3.99) (-4.96) (0.48) (1.67) (-1.42) (-4.95)
Performance pricing -28.606*** 0.144*** 3.967*** 0.164*** -0.071*** 0.2 -8.4***
(-12.59) (8.31) (9.46) (17.99) (-8.22) (0.47) (-3.29)
Refinancing 8.719*** 0.221*** 0.787* 0.132*** 0.035*** 1.6*** -1.2
(3.65) (11.71) (1.75) (13.97) (3.54) (3.14) (-0.39)
Observations 14,040 14,040 13,810 14,040 14,040 9418 3816
Adjusted R2 0.590 0.869 0.540 0.505 0.390 0.40 0.22
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-yr FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Senior debt rating FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Type of loan FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Purpose of loan FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 5: cont’d
Panel B: Borrower-level Loan amount Number of loans
(1) (2)
Local bankruptcy -0.03 -0.009
(-1.32) (-1.32)
Leverage ratio 0.8*** 0.2***
(13.52) (13.68)
Firm size 0.8*** 0.03***
(77.08) (9.28)
Return on Assets 0.6*** -0.07***
(5.77) (-2.96)
Market to book ratio -0.007 -0.003
(-0.65) (-1.28)
Asset tangibility -0.2 -0.02
(-1.32) (-1.47)
Cashflow volatility -0.2*** 0.01
(-3.17) (0.82)
Return volatility -5.0*** 0.3
(-6.69) (1.30)
Bankruptcy propensity 0.2** 0.03
(2.43) (0.82)
Observations 11,473 11,473
Adjusted R2 0.82 0.12
Industry FE Yes Yes
State-yr FE Yes Yes
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Table 6: Addressing selection bias
This table presents estimates from regressions of firms’ loan all-in-drawn spreads (which equals
spread + annual fee) on a dummy variable indicating a local bankruptcy in the previous year. The
regression specification is the same as in Table 3, column (3). In column (1), we exclude return
on assets from the set of control variables. In column (2), we exclude asset tangibility from the
set of control variables. In column (3), we exclude both, ROA and asset tangibility from the set of
control variables. All variables are defined in detail in Appendix A. Standard errors are clustered
by borrower level. t-statistics are provided in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1,
5, and 10 percent level, respectively.
Remove Remove Remove
ROA asset ROA & asset
tangibility tangibility
(1) (2) (3)
Local bankruptcy 8.7*** 8.2*** 9.1***
(4.01) (3.79) (4.18)
Observations 14,040 14,040 14,040
Adjusted R2 0.54 0.55 0.54
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
State-yr FE Yes Yes Yes
Senior debt rating FE Yes Yes Yes
Type of loan FE Yes Yes Yes
Purpose of loan FE Yes Yes Yes
Control variables Yes Yes Yes
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Table 7: Controlling for industry effects
This table presents estimates from regressions of firms’ loan all-in-drawn spreads (which equals
spread + annual fee) on a dummy variable indicating a local bankruptcy in the previous year. The
regression specification is the same as in Table 3, column (3). In column (1), we replace industry
fixed effects with industry×year fixed effects. In column (2), we exclude all local firms from the
same industry as the filing firm. In column (3), we further exclude all local firms in industries
with significant economic exposure to the industry of the filing firm. All variables are defined in
detail in Appendix A. Standard errors are clustered by borrower level. t-statistics are provided in
parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.
Industry-year Remove firms Remove firms
FE in same industry in supply chain
(1) (2) (3)
Local bankruptcyt−1 6.035*** 7.572*** 8.286***
(2.76) (3.21) (3.62)
Observations 14,040 10,158 12,203
Adjusted R2 0.620 0.601 0.582
Control variables Yes Yes Yes
Industry-yr FE Yes No No
Industry FE No Yes Yes
State-yr FE Yes Yes Yes
Senior debt rating FE Yes Yes Yes
Type of loan FE Yes Yes Yes
Purpose of loan FE Yes Yes Yes
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Table 8: The impact of distance on geographic contagion
This table presents estimates from regressions of firms’ loan all-in-drawn spreads (which equals
spread + annual fee) on a dummy variable indicating a local bankruptcy in the previous year. The
regression specification is the same as in Table 3, column (3). In columns (1) and (3), we replace our
baseline local bankruptcy variable (50 kilometers county-radius) with dummy variables reflecting
a 100 and 200 kilometers county-radius surrounding a filing firm, respectively. In columns (2) and
(4), in addition to our baseline local bankruptcy variable (50 kilometers county-radius), we also
include dummy variables reflecting a 100 and 200 kilometers county-radius surrounding a filing firm,
respectively. In column (5), we additionally include an interaction between the local bankruptcy
indicator and a local density indicator. We also include the local density indicator itself, which
equals one if a firm’s local population is larger than the country median of the same year, and
zero otherwise. In column (6), we replace our baseline local bankruptcy variable with a population-
adjusted bankruptcy variable. Specifically, for each firm’s location, we classify its population rank,
ranking from one (most populated) to five (least populated). We then expand our geographic circle
for firms located in sparse areas. We leave the distance of consideration unchanged (i.e. 50 km)
for firms with population rank of one and increase it by an incremental 25 km (i.e. 50% of the
original distance) for each increase in density ranking from two to five. All variables are defined in
detail in Appendix A. Standard errors are clustered by borrower level. t-statistics are provided in
parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.
100 km 50 & 100 km 200 km 50 & 200 km Local Population
Density adj. bankruptcy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Local bankruptcyt−1 6.918** 7.235*** 8.6***
(2.06) (3.13) (3.16)
Local bankruptcyt−1 - 100km 4.645** -0.966
(1.99) (-0.27)
Local bankruptcyt−1 - 200km -1.443 -3.814
(-0.59) (-1.49)






Observations 11,992 11,992 11,937 11,937 13,470 13,470
Adjusted R2 0.589 0.589 0.587 0.587 0.55 0.55
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-yr FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Senior debt rating FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Type of loan FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Purpose of loan FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 9: Do local bankruptcies affect local economic conditions?
Panel A presents estimates from regressions of firms’ loan all-in-drawn spreads (which equals spread
+ annual fee) on a dummy variable indicating a local bankruptcy in the previous year. The re-
gression specification is the same as in Table 3, column (3). In column (1), we additionally control
for time-varying local economic conditions by including the natural logarithm of the number of
business establishments, population, and per capita income. In column (2), we additionally control
for firm’s business network by including the natural logarithm of the number of firm’s economic
centers as well as its interaction with the local bankruptcy indicator. In column (3), we control for
firm’s local economic exposure by including an indicator for whether firms operate in industries that
are classified as tradable by (Mian and Sufi (2014)) and its interaction with the local bankruptcy
indicator. Panel B presents county-level regressions of firms’ local economic conditions on a dummy
variable indicating a local bankruptcy in the previous year. The dependent variables in columns (1)
and (2) are the natural logarithm of the number of employment and establishments in a firm’s local
area. All regressions include year, state-year and county fixed effects. Panel C (Panel D) presents
changes in local firms’ CDS spreads (cumulative abnormal stock returns) for windows of one, five
and ten days before and after a local bankruptcy. All variables are defined in detail in Appendix A.
Standard errors are clustered by borrower level. t-statistics are provided in parentheses. ***, **, *
indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.
Panel A: Controlling for local business cycles
County controls Diversified firms Tradability of goods
(1) (2) (3)
















Observations 13,219 11,863 12,606
Adjusted R2 0.579 0.590 0.582
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
State-yr FE Yes Yes Yes
Senior debt rating FE Yes Yes Yes
Type of loan FE Yes Yes Yes
Purpose of loan FE Yes Yes Yes
Control variables Yes Yes Yes
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Table 9: cont’d




Local bankruptcy -0.0005 0.0009
(-0.21) (1.33)
Size of working population 1.1*** 1.0***
(32.01) (59.41)
Income per capita 0.09*** 0.004
(3.22) (0.36)
Ratio of small firms 13.0*** 31.2***
(7.02) (26.30)
Ratio of large firms 447.8*** 13.2
(14.40) (1.55)
Observations 3,873 3,873
Adjusted R2 0.998 0.998
Year FE Yes Yes
State-yr FE Yes Yes
County FE Yes Yes
Panel C: CDS
Event window CASC t-stat
[−1, 1] -1.716 -0.24
[−3, 3] -1.104 -0.72
[−5, 5] -5.947* -1.31
Panel D: Stock returns
Event window CAR t-stat
[−1, 1] 0.018% 0.26
[−3, 3] -0.049% -0.48
[−5, 5] -0.129% -1.02
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Table 10: Impact of local bankruptcies on local default risks
Panel A presents estimates from firm-level regressions of distress probability on a dummy variable
indicating a local bankruptcy in the previous year. In column (1), the dependent variable is a
default indicator that equals one if a firm’s debt rating is either “D” or “SD”, and zero otherwise.
In column (2), the dependent variable is a downgrade indicator that equals one if a firm’s debt
rating is downgraded in a given year, and zero otherwise. In column (3), the dependent variable is
an indicator of borrower’s bankruptcy propensity that equals one if a borrower files for bankruptcy
within three years after the loan origination date, and zero otherwise. In column (4), the dependent
variable is a forward-looking indicator of a firm’s eventual bankruptcy, adjusted to match the
average value-weighted maturity of all loans of the firm. All regressions include industry and state-
year fixed effects. Columns (1) and (2) of Panel B present estimates from loan-level regressions
on subsamples of unsecured loans and revolver loans, respectively. The regression specification is
the same as in Table 3, column (3). Panel C presents estimates from firm-level regression of firm’s
propensity of technical default. In columns (1) to (3), technical default propensity is defined as
the proximity between firm’s actual ratios and their corresponding contractual covenants including
minimum interest coverage, maximum debt to cashflow and current ratio, respectively. In column
(4), the dependent variable is an indicator that equals one if there is a reported covenant violation
in a given year, and zero otherwise. All variables are defined in detail in Appendix A. Standard
errors are clustered by borrower level. t-statistics are provided in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate
significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.
Panel A: Borrower-level Default Downgrade Bankruptcy Matched
propensity bankruptcy
prop.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Local bankruptcyt−1 0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.000
(1.15) (-0.23) (0.12) (-0.14)
Leverage ratio 0.009*** 0.058*** 0.041*** 0.0415***
(3.61) (9.28) (9.07) (9.04)
Firm size 0.000** 0.017*** -0.000 -0.000
(2.00) (19.49) (-0.12) (-0.23)
Return on Assets -0.010*** 0.043*** -0.076*** -0.077***
(-2.81) (5.10) (-9.12) (-9.07)
Observations 25,734 25,734 25,734 25,734
Adjusted R2 0.058 0.074 0.062 0.027
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-yr FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Loan-level Unsecured loans Revolver loans
(1) (2)
Local bankruptcy 7.2*** 9.0***
(3.17) (4.29)
Observations 3,932 10,522
Adjusted R2 0.51 0.59
Control variables Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes
State-yr FE Yes Yes
Senior debt rating FE Yes Yes
Type of loan FE Yes Yes
Purpose of loan FE Yes Yes
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Table 10: cont’d
Panel C: Technical defaults Distance to default Covenant violation
(Borrower-level) Interest coverage Profitability Current ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Local bankruptcy 3.4 0.07 -0.02 -0.000
(1.01) (0.92) (-1.52) (-0.01)
Leverage ratio 38.9*** -1.1** 0.04 0.08***
(6.33) (-2.07) (1.35) (5.93)
Firm size 2.2* -0.01 0.02*** -0.01***
(1.79) (-0.41) (3.05) (-7.08)
Return on Assets -43.9*** -0.6 0.03 -0.2***
(-3.42) (-0.48) (0.48) (-6.52)
Market to book ratio -7.7* 0.2** -0.009 -0.009***
(-1.89) (2.45) (-1.18) (-4.16)
Asset tangibility -7.7 0.6 0.5*** 0.006
(-0.91) (1.10) (10.82) (0.42)
Cashflow volatility 16.8* 0.3 0.03 -0.08***
(1.69) (0.49) (0.45) (-4.25)
Return volatility 54.1 30.3 -0.7 1.9***
(0.47) (1.24) (-1.56) (7.95)
Observations 3259 5282 1090 11658
Adjusted R2 0.21 0.17 0.56 0.11
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-yr FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 11: Bank balance sheet channel
This table presents estimates from regressions of firms’ loan all-in-drawn spreads (which equals
spread + annual fee) on a dummy variable indicating a local bankruptcy in the previous year. The
regression specification is the same as in Table 3, column (3). In columns (1) and (2), we consider
subsamples of firms that have no bankruptcy exposure, or belong to the top 30 largest banks,
respectively. In columns (3) to (5), we interact the local bankruptcy variable with a Herfindahl index
(HHI) of local lenders, lender profitability, and equity ratio, respectively. All variables are defined
in detail in Appendix A. Standard errors are clustered by borrower level. t-statistics are provided
in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.
No Top 30 Local Lender’s Lender’s
bankruptcy banks banking profitability equity
exposure concentration ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Local bankruptcyt−1 7.370*** 5.848** 5.334** -5.153 15.37**
(3.41) (2.31) (2.37) (-0.80) (1.98)
Local bankruptcyt−1×HHI of local lenders 10.554**
(2.01)
HHI of local lenders -5.149
(-1.52)




Local bankruptcyt−1 × Lender equity ratio -129.6
(-1.29)
Lender equity ratio -7.130
(-0.08)
Observations 13,327 6,925 14,032 11,135 11,760
Adjusted R2 0.575 0.660 0.579 0.565 0.565
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-yr FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Senior debt rating FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Type of loan FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Purpose of loan FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 12: Informational opaqueness
This table presents estimates from regressions of firms’ loan all-in-drawn spreads (which equals
spread + annual fee) on a dummy variable indicating a local bankruptcy in the previous year. The
regression specification is the same as in Table 3, column (3). In columns (1) and (2) of Panel A, we
interact the local bankruptcy variable with the news coverage of a local bankruptcy event, and the
intangibility ratio of the bankrupt firm, respectively. In columns (3) and (4) of Panel A, we interact
the local bankrutpcy indicator with firm age and a rural area indicator, respectively. In columns
(1) and (2) of Panel B, we interact the local bankruptcy indicator with lenders’ local market share
and the size of their branch network, respectively. In columns (3) and (4) of Panel B, we run the
regression on subsamples of relationship and transaction deals, respectively. All variables are defined
in detail in Appendix A. Standard errors are clustered by borrower level. t-statistics are provided
in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.
Panel A: Bankrupt and borrowing firms Bankrupt firms Borrowers
News Intangibility Firm Rural
coverage ratio age area
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Local bankruptcyt−1 8.250*** 5.472** 13.93∗∗∗ 7.983∗∗∗
(3.82) (2.22) (4.48) (3.64)
Local bankruptcyt−1 × News coverage - Bankrupt firms -1.410***
(-2.83)
News coverage - Bankrupt firms 0.108***
(6.00)
Local bankruptcyt−1 × Intangibility - Bankrupt firms 4.151**
(1.98)
Intangibility - Bankrupt firms -0.739
(-0.42)








Observations 13,526 11,628 14,040 14,040
Adjusted R2 0.545 0.553 0.545 0.545
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-yr FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Senior debt rating FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Type of loan FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Purpose of loan FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 12: cont’d
Panel B: Lenders Local exposure Arm-length lending
Local market Bank branch Relationship Transaction
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Local bankruptcy 11.214*** 0.841 3.660 10.58∗∗∗
(3.77) (0.25) (1.15) (3.76)
Local bankruptcyt−1 × Local market share -6.684*
(-1.91)
Local market share -4.209
(-1.37)
Local bankruptcyt−1 × Lender branch network 0.00316*
(1.81)
Lender branch network -0.00327**
(-1.99)
Observations 13,928 10,763 5,227 8,813
Adjusted R2 0.579 0.561 0.599 0.512
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-yr FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Senior debt rating FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Type of loan FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Purpose of loan FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Figure 1: Bankruptcies from 1990 to 2013
This figure shows the percentage of bankruptcies in each U.S. state as a fraction of all bankruptcies
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Appendix A - Variable definitions




Sum of the spread over LIBOR plus the facility fee. Dealscan
All-in-undrawn Sum of the facility fee and the commitment fee. Dealscan
Base is prime An indicator variable equal to one if the base rate for a
loan is the prime rate rather than LIBOR (and zero
otherwise).
Dealscan
Commitment fee Dealscan fee paid on the unused amount of loan
commitments.
Dealscan
Coupon All-in-drawn spread, defined as spread over LIBOR. Dealscan
Deal amount Natural logarithm of loan amount. Dealscan
Default An indicator variable equal to one if a firm’s debt is rated
either “D” or “SD” in a given year (and zero otherwise).
Dealscan
Facility fee Fee paid on the entire committed amount, regardless of
usage. Also called annual fee, is the annual charge against
the entire loan commitment amount, whether used or
unused.
Dealscan
Financial covenant An indicator variable equal to one if a loan has financial
covenants (and zero otherwise).
Dealscan
Maturity The number of calendar months between the loan




An indicator variable equal to one if a loan contains a
performance pricing feature, either interest-increasing or
interest-decreasing (and zero otherwise).
Dealscan
Refinancing An indicator variable equal to one if a loan refinances a
previous loan (and zero otherwise).
Dealscan
Relationship lender An indicator variable equal to one if a borrower has
another loan from the same lead arranger in the three
years prior to loan origination (and zero otherwise).
Dealscan
Revolver loan An indicator equal to one if a facility is classified as
’Revolver’ loan in Dealscan (and zero otherwise).
Dealscan
Secured loan An indicator equal to one if a facility is secured as
indicated by Dealscan.
Dealscan
Sole lender An indicator variable equal to one if a loan has a sole
lender (and zero otherwise).
Dealscan
Spread All-in-drawn loan spread measured at origination, defined
as the sum of the spread over LIBOR plus the annual
(facility) fee.
Dealscan
Unsecured loan An indicator equal to one if a facility is not secured (and
zero otherwise).
Dealscan
Upfront fee Fee paid upon completion of a syndicated loan. Dealscan
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Appendix A - Variable definitions
Variable Description Data sources
Firm characteristics
Asset tangibility Property, plant and equipment over total assets. Compustat
Bankruptcy
propensity
An indicator variable equal to one if a borrower files for
bankruptcy within three years of the loan origination date
(and zero otherwise).
Compustat
CAR Cumulative abnormal returns using the Fama and French
three factor model.
CRSP
Cash flow volatility The standard deviation of operating income before
depreciation divided by total assets over the five years
before the loan origination date.
Compustat
CDS Rating-adjusted CDS spread. ASjt= SjtIrt, where Sjt
denotes the CDS spread of reference entity j at day t and
Irt is the equally weighted CDS index of rating r at day t.
The index r refers to the five rating categories including
AAA/AA, A, BBB, BB, and B or below.
Markit CDS
Covenant violation An indicator that equals one if there is a reported
covenant violation in a given year, and zero otherwise.
Nini, Smith, and
Sufi (2012)
Current ratio Total current assets divided by total assets. Compustat
Debt to cash flow
ratio
Debt divided by EBITDA (Earnings before interest, taxes
and depreciation).
Compustat
Default An indicator that equals one if a firm’s debt rating is
rated either “D” or “SD”, and zero otherwise
Compustat




Downgrade An indicator variable equal to one if a firm experiences a
downgrade in its debt rating in a given year (and zero
otherwise).
Compustat
Economic Center An indicator variable equal to one if the number of
economic states of a firm is higher than its median value
of the sample (and zero otherwise).
10K Reports
Firm age The difference between the current financial year and IPO
year or the earliest year that a firm reports financial data
on Compustat.
Compustat
Firm size Natural logarithm of the book value of total assets. Compustat
Interest coverage EBITDA divided by interest expenses. Compustat
Leverage ratio Long-term debt plus short-term debt divided by book
value of total assets.
Compustat
Loan amount Natural logarithm of total loan amount at the firm-year
level
Dealscan
Local density Indicator that equals one if a firm’s local population is




Book value of assets, less book value of equity, plus




An indicator of a firm’s subsequent bankruptcy, adjusted
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Appendix A - Variable definitions
Variable Description Data sources
Return on assets Earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation
(EBITDA) over total assets.
Compustat
Return volatility Standard deviation of the returns of a firm in a 252
trading day period prior to the loan origination date.
Compustat
rigination date. Compustat
Rural area An indicator equal to one if a firm locates in a county
whose population is in the bottom 30 percentile of a given
sample year, and zero otherwise.
Census
Tradability dummy An indicator variable equal to one if industries are






An indicator variable equal to one if the local HHI index
is higher than the median number of all lenders’ HHI
indices in a given year (and zero otherwise). The local
HHI index is the sum of squared market shares, based on




The number of brick and mortar branches of a lender’s
bank holding company in a firm’s local area.
FDIC






An indicator variable equal to one if a lender’s local total
lending in firm’s local area is larger than the median
county-level lending amount of all lenders in our sample
(and zero otherwise).
Dealscan
Top 30 banks A subsample only including loans whose lenders belong to




Local bankruptcy An indicator that equals one if there is at least one
bankruptcy filing in the year before the loan origination







An indicator that equals one if there is at least one
bankruptcy filing in the year before the loan origination







An indicator that equals one if there is at least one
bankruptcy filing in the year before the loan origination







The number of news articles in the Wall Street Journal,
New York Times, USA Today, and Washington Post
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Appendix A - Variable definitions
Variable Description Data sources
Intangibility -
Bankrupt firms





An indicator that equals one if there is at least one
bankruptcy filing in the year before the loan
origination date and in the same county or close-by






Income per capita The natural logarithm of income per capita in a
firm’s local area
Census





The natural logarithm of number of establishments




The natural logarithm of income per capita in a
firm’s local area
Census
Local population The natural logarithm of number of population in a
firm’s local area
Census
Ratio of large firms The ratio of number of large firms (number of
employees above 249 people) over total population




The ratio of number of small firms (number of
employees below 249 people) over total population




The natural logarithm of number of people aged 15
to 65 living in a firm’s local area
Census
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